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1． Introduction
1.1. Fatal neglect
 Humanitarian intervention as a controversial international phenomenon 
has caught central attention across national borders and disciplinary divisions. 
The ongoing discussion of rights and responsibility related to humanitarian 
intervention by and large bifurcates into two branches, in defence respectively 
of either the norm of state sovereignty and its corollary non-intervention, 
or the concern with human rights. Defenders of human rights claim that 
individuals are entitled, regardless of nationality or ethnicity, to fundamental 
human dignity. They argue that it is of ideal and altruistic nature for a third 
party to intervene in a sovereign state where there are massive violations of 
such entitlement (Wheeler 2000; Brown 2002). Some of them claim that a 
new norm of humanitarian intervention has been emerging. They engage a 
great deal of effort to seek justification from the voluminous and often-found 
inconsistent body of international treaties and conventions (Ramsbothan and 
Woodhouse 1996; Roberts 1994, 1996, and 2000; Sarooshi 1999). Others regret 
that the West has been too constrained in their efforts to protect human rights 
therefore more political and practical measures are necessary to sustain their 
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good will (Macfarlane 2001). By invoking the same ground on human rights, 
others seek to justify international legitimate military action by endorsing 
human rights as a moral demand (Teson 1997). A corollary of this argument 
is that humanitarian intervention is part of ethical foreign policy.
 To this line of arguments partisans of state sovereignty vehemently disagree. 
They invoke in their defence the international norms of independence and 
equality regardless of territory size or political system. The contention 
resorting to sovereignty exists in developed world as much as in the developing 
world, yet it is the later that tends to cast greater suspicion, pointing to, 
for example the selectiveness on the developed agenda of humanitarian 
intervention. Arguments from this perspective generally manifest mistrust of 
the humanitarian claims. The charge is either that such claims are a smoke 
screen for the pursuit of selfish interests (Thurke 2002); or that they are 
unrealistic and beyond the capacity of the powerful (Best 1995). Followers of 
the sovereignty norm are suspicious of the human rights promise by pointing 
as evidence to cases such as French intervention in Rwanda and UN in 
Somalia. They contend that human rights claim is abused as a machination 
for major powers to realize their own geopolitical interests and that the weak 
states are being trampled down in the form of a neo-interventionism (Mayall 
1996; Thurke 2002).
 Still others have shown sophistication in taking side. For example, invoking 
human rights concern, some argue that military intervention can be justified 
if, and only if, there are such severe massive violations of basic rights that 
exceed a threshold; at the same time they suggest that the respect for the 
sovereign rights of states maintain a central place among the principles 
governing relations between states. In other words, they argue, humanitarian 
intervention should be considered only as an extraordinary exception, and 
should not be explicitly recognized as a right under international law (ICISS 
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Regional Roundtables London 2001).
 As demonstrated in the practice as well as in these debates, all sides demand 
observation of international law; but disagree on when and what. International 
law in this case has simply provided a false ground for agreement. This muddle 
reveals the failure to reconcile the logical contradictions (non-intervention 
versus human rights) in international society, which is understood as a 
constitution of competing norms and rules defining actorsʼ legitimate or 
desirable goals, and at the same time an institution lacking any authoritative 
resolve of conflicts (the anarchic state of international affairs) (Wight 1968; 
Bull 1977/1995; Philpott 2001).
 This failure manifests that, beyond the usage of the term ʻhumanitarian 
interventionʼ, which itself is an oxymoron or misnomer, the state practice 
and worldwide debates involving different starting points and goals and from 
various perspectives can not but add more complexity to any effort to draw 
upon a unified logic in understanding and explanation that can match the 
urgency and incidence considering the already pervaded dire consequences. 
That the recalcitrance to any systematic and persuasive analysis the set of 
questions concerning humanitarian intervention demonstrates has posed 
enormous challenge to the International Relations scholarship as well as 
others.
 That it is particularly challenging for the IR scholarship can be understood 
as its overwhelming attention paid to one of the two logics of action 
characterising all social and political environments, namely, logics of expected 
consequences, the other being logics of appropriateness (March and Olsen 
1989 and 1998). Logics of consequences will follow when there are multiple 
and contradictory roles and rules as well as obvious results expected from 
different actions. When these logics are at work, political action tends to be 
merely instrumental behaviour. When actors find themselves in a situation 
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where their roles, identities are well-defined and there are obvious rules to 
follow, logics of appropriateness will weigh heavily. In domestic as well as 
international levels, it can be contended that under certain circumstances 
one set of logics prevails the other. But in addressing the anarchic character 
of international society, international political scientists have overwhelmingly 
attended to the goals defined in international society (not the rules and norms 
that bind actors and regulate behaviour), hence to the consequence logics. A 
major task has been assigned to account for how rules and norms operate, 
rather than to trace how and why they have come about.
 This diagnose is exemplified in the little effort made to attend the logics 
of appropriateness. As noted above, recent literature in humanitarian 
intervention has witnessed work examining the European/Western roots of 
international humanitarian law and to explore the lawʼs present. Conflicts 
and contrasts in beliefs and values are observed that are manifested in the 
developed and the developing statesʼ policies and rhetoric implications (Roberts 
1994, 1996 and 1998). Unfortunately, however, there is no sign for any attempt 
to inquire ʻwhether, and if so, to what extent, these differences and conflicts of 
cultural values may explain the policy failures of the powerful?ʼ In fact, sharp 
diagnoses of value conflicts that might have caused some, if not all, failings and 
selectiveness of humanitarian actions are obscured by conventional treatment 
focused solely on problem-solving. In the case of Persian Gulf (UNIKOM 1991), 
Cambodia (UNAMIC, 1991-2; UNTAC 1993), Somalia (UNOSOM I, 1992-3; 
UNOSOM II 1993), Rwanda (UNAMIR 1993), ʻmainly small and/or developing 
statesʼ are identified with contention against humanitarian intervention, but 
in the evaluation of their power of intervention, the powerful not only failed 
to explicate, but in fact sought to bypass, the contention (Roberts 1994: 19). 
Many seem to take it for granted that such actions are an application of a right 
of ʻhumanitarian interventionʼ. By overlooking at non-Western contention, it 
127
千葉大学　公共研究　第 13 巻第１号（2017 年３月）
may easily follow. It may prove however simply wishful to take intervention 
as a right if one looks into for example the draft resolution proposed by China 
and Russia during the Security Council debate on Kosovo in 1999 condemning 
bombing by the NATO forces. But treatments go on with mere engagement 
to strategize military and non-military actions: either analysis of power 
asymmetries among principal actors, differing incentives confronting states 
(S. N. Macfarlane, 2001), or exploration of new mechanisms to, ranging from, 
for example, improve coordination among governments, to reinterpret the 
laws of war for new justification.1
 It is not deniable that these efforts can be helpful to relieve disasters and to 
mitigate dire consequences. But obviously it fails so often in providing proper 
treatment. Somehow curiously in this literature, incomprehension among 
peoples does not seem to exist, let alone addressed. It hence begs a question: 
doesn’t the miscalculation of the power asymmetry have anything to do with 
neglecting the developing statesʼ contention by the powerful?
 This question makes sense in particular when many still take it for granted 
that ʻthere is a division of “us” and “them” (not to mention a sense of superiority 
each of the “us” side may hold)ʼ and efforts should mainly or even solely be put 
into playing the game of political machination. Conjecture may or may not be 
right; but it may well be reasonable to assume that it is here where Western 
evaluation fails of the ideational power the developing states bear: It is only 
a truism to say that very often such a game has ended in partiality and dire 
1 While for good reasons, the UN major powers tend to ︙in the hope not to subject 
the UNʼs mandate to the ʻwhim of any local leaderʼ, there is equally a danger in 
some efforts to rewrite the laws of war in subjecting international ︙to some powersʼ 
whim︙For example, some international lawyers seek to justify military intervention 
to restore a democratic regime (eg. Haiti 1992) as could be grouped under the label 
of ʻhumanitarianʼ (Frank, Thomas M.1992), and extending this line of justification 
to any such ʻgood senseʼ (Franck T. M. 2003).
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consequences, if not always disasters. More than often, not inadvertently, even 
if ʻourʼ ambitions were somehow realized, the outcome could not be devoid of 
international condemnation of illegitimacy or injustice.2 If political strategies 
alone can not solve all problems (in fact they are too often producing dire 
consequences in long term) --- thinking about how desperately the question 
is asked ʻwhat else can realistically be done to prevent the reoccurrence of 
humanitarian disasters?ʼ (Roberts 1994), and how scant effect some sort of 
answers can yield --- for any serious thinker about international life, another 
question is bound to arise: ʻTo prevent the reoccurrence of such humanitarian 
disasters, is it appropriate for the powerful to pursue any such intervention in 
the way they do it (ʻappropriateʼ in terms of roles, rules, identities and given 
situations)?ʼ In other words, I contend that one way to get dragged out of the 
mire may well be just to shift the focus from the logics of consequences to the 
logics of appropriateness, and to endeavour to account for in what kind of 
environment the latter may work better, and what approaches can be seen to 
create such environment.
1.2. The argument
 It is this shift of focus that this essay attempts to bring to the International 
Relations scholarship concerning humanitarian intervention. In so doing, I 
am not polarising the two lines of logics, which can be working in an entangled 
2 As observed by Roberts, for example, the downgrading of consent of the parties as 
a key criterion in UN decision-making ʻ without full discussion of all the implicationsʼ 
has fatally weakened principles of the UN peacekeeping. While defending that 
ʻreduction in the emphasis on consentʼ as happened ʻfor good reasonsʼ including 
enabling fulfilment of UN mandate, as demonstrated in the case of UNOSOM 
II (The United Nations Operation in Somalia II) and UNPROFOR in former 
Yugoslavia, he reckoned that it could facilitate a tendency ʻto regard peacekeeping 
as a flexible techniqueʼ, which lacks legal basis, and is subject to questioning its 
purposes (Roberts 1994: 17-21).
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way. Emphasise on one is simply a remedy when the other alone has gone too 
far to be true. As shown above, the neglect of logics of appropriateness has 
led to overwhelming attention to instrumental political calculation and action 
which consequently resulted in disasters in humanitarian intervention. 
But this is only part of the picture. Indeed, the neglecting of the logics of 
appropriateness can also lead to actorsʼ blindness to, or distortion of, 
evaluation of the self and the other. Considering the fact that targeted party 
of humanitarian intervention is often found to be an entity in the developing 
world, it is somehow strange that the IR scholarship continues to ignore the 
specification of the contention from that part of the world, which may be based 
on identical or alternative ideations. It is curious, since even when the logics 
of consequences prevail (as the IR scholarship often tends to show), for any 
utilitarian purpose it requires understanding and assessment of the enemyʼs 
power (material as well as ideational), why the international community can 
not but fail to accommodate the alternative contention if intervention in the 
name of ʻhumanitarianʼ is still high on its agenda. Given that politics is not 
only phronesis or practical wisdom deployed to reach an end, but also about 
fathom competing values and decide what is good, desirable and appropriate 
in our communal life,3 this failure is startling. Given the fact that in a global 
club of states where members are divided into jurisdictions of widely varying 
cultural characteristics, which from time to time provokes international 
controversy and apprehension that threaten stability and international 
security, such a failure is appalling.4
 In this article chapter I am not tempted to exercise any causal inference 
between the main elements of the Western cultural value and the selectiveness 
3 C. Brown made a point to contend the conventional argument that ʻpoliticsʼ 
requires government, that authoritative allocation of values is central to the process, 
in defence of the validity of ʻinternational political theoryʼ(C. Brown 2002: 6-7). 
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or failings of humanitarian intervention. Nor do I attempt to device criteria to 
judge policy activity or value systems. I do not either pretend that this work 
will yield any judgements on legal validity of norms or decision on whether 
humanitarian intervention now is, or is not, part of just cogens, or the like.5
 Rather, I suggest that it bears tremendous importance to explore ideational 
factors that exert more fundamental influence on decision-making such 
as cultural values at work for norm emergence and normative diffusion.6 I 
contend that conception of the key terms in the debate such as sovereignty 
and human rights bears very different connotations in the developing states 
from that in the developed where main stream Western culture embodies and 
entails these concepts. Since rules, norms are mechanisms for regulating the 
4 This inability has been associated with some form of rationality assumptions 
utilized by both neorealism and game theory, and various interrelated problems 
(Wendt 1992; A. Yee 1996): although it is acknowledged that in world politics 
currently new and revived ideas apparently play crucial roles in decision-making 
and policy implementation, the IR scholarship continues to demonstrate an inability 
to address the effects of ideational factors such as cultural values and beliefs in 
decision-making and policy implementation. While for professional prudence, many 
IR scholars are either reluctant to go beyond a realist analytical framework, or 
hesitant to accept the methodologies employed to explore effects of ideational factors 
on policy, recent IR scholarship has seen the return of culture in its research agenda 
since the last decade. For example, constructivists such as Wendt who has seminally 
questioned the ʻanarchy problematicʼ stressed by political realists, classical and neo-, 
and, together with liberals, are engaged in researching, for example, institution, 
which is not given but tainted with contingency (Wendt 1992 and 1999; Finnemore 
1996b). An inter-disciplinary work on norms, rules and their implications at both 
domestic and international levels, has been done by Kratochwil (Kratochwil 1991)
5 It is the lawyerʼs job to determine the authenticity and sources of international 
law and to establish certainty and explicate the standing rules of international life. 
My approach is essentially IR. But I think it is necessary to unite international law 
and politics in studying effects of values on normative diffusion. For discussions 
about different methodologies in IR and international law, see, for example, articles 
includes under ʻSymposium on Methodʼ, The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 93:36. 
6 Exploration and specification of mechanisms of normative diffusion is the task of 
Chapter 3.
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social behaviour of human beings interacting with one another as organized 
groups, to make humanitarian law valid and relevant and to make such 
action as much viable in any part of the world as possible, it is necessary to 
forge a genuine common language and to reach consensus in international 
community. I argue that not only value itself is not a dismissible or marginal 
factor in our responding to international contention about humanitarian 
intervention, but also that, bringing into consideration the importance of 
interaction between different value systems, and moreover, to well-facilitate 
such interaction will be very helpful to promoting mutual understanding, and 
generating (not imposing whereby there is always resistance and backlash) a 
common language and consensus; and that ignoring contending arguments 
and not incorporating non-Western thoughts into the decision-making process 
of intervention manifests a weakening of the viability of such law or norm and 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, and constitutes a fatal flaw in the 
power evaluation of the powerful.
1.3. The central task and a two-tiered three steps approach
 There maybe more than one way to accomplish the tasks as set above. One of 
them is to draw upon the sophisticated understanding of how transmigration 
of ideas takes place across cultures, a topic which has become central to 
fields such as cultural studies (C. Hughes 2001). It is important, however, in 
following this line of thinking, to restrict to encompass only those political 
ideas and beliefs that are given public. This is so simply because political 
analysis addresses only specifically political ideas; and imprecise specification 
of the ideational factors that allegedly are generating policy resultants can not 
but divert the central task of identifying causation.
 Moreover, since causes are usually multiple and indeterminate in the social 
world, the ideational factor is generally one of many probable causes of policy, 
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it is necessary to develop adequate correctional approaches to identify key 
causation. One way to ensure accuracy is to follow a two-tiered approach. In 
the first tier two steps are involved to establish explanatory links between 
ideational factors and decision-making. The first step is called congruence 
procedure. It is to deduce implications of the actorʼs operational code beliefs 
for decision, and then examine whether the characteristics of the decision 
are consistent with the actorʼs beliefs. If the two are congruent, then there 
is at least a presumption that the beliefs may have played a causal role in 
this particular instance if decision-making (A. L. George in L. S. Falkowski 
ed. 1979, A. Yee 1996). As congruency or consistency itself does not suffice to 
establish causation, this procedure needs to be supplemented and completed 
by a second step, namely, process tracing procedure (A. Yee 1996). The two 
steps do not have to be in this order. Work some times starts with tracing 
procedure (Khong 1992), and the two steps can be interrelated in actual 
exercise of causal inference since the deduction serves a road map guiding out 
the tracing procedure. This method can suffice to demonstrate a cogent causal 
relation only when a second tier of work is completed. At the second tier is 
a process providing evidence in which mechanisms of causal interactions are 
involved (Salmon 1990). Mechanisms should be explicated to show ideations 
are while institutionalised exerting direct influence on policy.
 My central task, as noted in the last section, is to show ideational factors 
concerning humanitarian intervention play an important role in decision-
making in order to account for the importance for promoting international 
interaction across cultures. What I do in the following is to specify and explicate 
two sets of ideations identical with or alternative to elements in the main 
stream of west culture, which purport to consist in the contention against 
humanitarian intervention. I then move to two separate parts in each I trace 
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how these ideations respectively yield the contending position as manifested 
in the rhetoric and policy concerned (assuming these two are consistent is 
reasonable since official rhetoric is to support and justify policy). In each of 
the two sections, the two-tiered three step approach is employed, so the degree 
is ascertained to which ideation--policy option relationship can be established. 
A fourth section is followed to analyse the discoveries about the consistency 
or inconsistency of the ideational factors with political position as manifested 
in policies. Based on discoveries from the tracing procedures, it then brings 
the threads of explication into one line of reasoning leading to approval or 
disapproval of the central argument. In accounting for how and why this 
causation may or may not happen, I examine the possibilities to build up a 
foundation for transmigration of ideas across cultures to generate a common 
language, which can serve as the basis of international normative consensus 
to discuss about and direct international humanitarian intervention.
 In other words, in section 2—4 I specify and examine ideational factors 
underlying the contending positions mainly taken by the developing states. 
The connotations of sovereignty for these states, the argument of universalism 
underlying human rights claim will be analysed together with the ʻWestern 
culture chargeʼ. In particular, the universality of human rights norm will be 
reinterpreted by extricating the Asian Value argument. These remarks arrive 
at one line winding through the labyrinth of the so called ʻdeveloping states 
contentionʼ by referring to the ʻstandard of civilizationʼ; that is to say, in section 
5, I explore the implications of these discoveries to the current humanitarian 
intervention debate and practice, concluding at a reliance on the institutional 
arrangements in international society that promote a common language of 
international relations.
 Before proceeding to the next section, it is necessary to clarify why in 
referring to contention drawing upon either identical or alternative elements 
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of ideations against humanitarian intervention I choose to use a term 
ʻdeveloping statesʼ (as seen in a ʻdeveloping-developed statesʼ dyad), instead of 
a more often usage in IR, namely the ʻThird Worldʼ.
1.4 ʻDeveloping statesʼ as a position
 The basic referent of the term ʻdeveloping statesʼ used in this essay shares 
most of these terms such as ʻSouthʼ in the ʻNorth-Southʼ dichotomy and the 
ʻPeripheryʼ as in the ʻCore-Peripheryʼ juxtapose. It overlaps with the referent 
of the ʻThird Worldʼ in terms of underdevelopment in economic, political 
spheres and of cultural difference. In IR the last term retains its analytical 
utility referring to a wide range of meanings. It is a deliberate choice to avoid 
the Third World in this paper. Among others, I see reasonable reluctance to 
refer to the ʻThird Worldʼ threefold.
 First, the ʻThird Worldʼ has a geographic connotation associated with 
underdevelopment theory. It includes states in world politics and economy 
in places outside Europe and North America, namely, Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America, Oceanic and even a few East European states (such as Yugoslavia) 
(Jackson 1990: 114). The image was not only of poverty and underdevelopment 
but also incivility and repression. Whereas in these areas variations in politics 
and economy, in civility and development are no less faint than that in Europe 
and North America, it is not feasible to have a conception to categorise these 
states in terms of geographical location.
 Second, it is a category used to examine the political and economic 
processes suggesting dominance and oppression. Identities of states under 
this category are associated with peripheralisation and victimisation.7 It 
7 For differentiation of the concept, see S. N. Macfarlane 2000 in Fawcett and Sayigh 
eds., 18-23; and James Blight and Thomas Weiss 1992 in Third World Quarterly 
13/2,249.
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suggests psychological trauma derived from sad history of oppression and 
occupation by the powerful, an unhealthy feeling that this chapter suggests is 
being overcome by these states themselves.
 Thirdly, in international relations this term emphasises the dependency on 
the world capitalism and a global class divisions. This division is vertically 
in terms of wealth and class rather than horizontally in terms of sovereign 
populated territory. This distinction is value-laden and ideological.
 Moreover, the term ʻdeveloping statesʼ does not entail a cleavage in terms 
of culture and value. Although it connotes division in terms of wealth and 
technology, it is less tainted by discrimination, while embodying some degree 
of equality and prospect for these states in world economy and politics. 
Furthermore, as it is only an analytical tool rather than evaluated usage 
consistent with contemporary political theory, I do not make a list under this 
term deciding whether G77 group or some 128 states or others should be 
included. Finally, where the term ʻnon-Westernʼ, or West, is used in this essay, 
it does not refer to the East-West ideological confrontation. Rather, it simply 
means all that which is outside or different from North America and Europe. 
Therefore contention addressed as ʻdeveloping statesʼ is more of a position 
than of ontological reference.
2. State Sovereignty
2.1. ʻAutonomyʼ as cardinal value underlying Sovereignty
 The society of states embodies certain values which any political and social 
analysis cannot and should not avoid. Although in the fabric of collective life 
they are entangled and embedded, it is not difficult to discern the cardinal 
and its corollary. The entire scheme or conception of international society sees 
independence or autonomy as its basic and overwhelming value. ʻVirtually all 
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the principles and practices of a sovereign states system derive either directly 
or indirectly from this desideratum.ʼ (Jackson 1990: 10). For the state to exert 
sovereignty, independence or autonomy is not only a desideratum but also 
pre-condition. This is expounded in Krasnerʼ differentiation of four meanings 
of sovereignty, namely, domestic sovereignty, referring to the organization of 
public authority within a state and to the level of effect control exercised by 
those holding authority; interdependence sovereignty, referring to the ability 
of public authorities to control trans-border movements; international legal 
sovereignty, referring to the mutual recognition of states or other entities; 
and Westphalia sovereignty, referring to the exclusion of external actors from 
domestic authority configurations (Krasner 1999: 9). These four meanings 
are not logically coupled. In invoking ʻstate sovereigntyʼ as a norm to contend 
against humanitarian intervention, the Westphalia sovereignty is most often 
referred to. It has become a most powerful weapon, as charged by the IR 
scholarship, to arm the developing states in their disagreement with the 
developed on intervention by the powerful (C. Brown 2002).
 Before I move to discuss how and why this norm has been so utilized, it is 
interesting to note a point made to challenge the widely accepted assumption 
that non-interventionism is a major feature of Westphalia system. Brown in 
telling a story about emerging humanitarian intervention norm claims that 
ʻa strong general norm forbidding intervention on humanitarian grounds 
was…established in the mid-twentieth centuryʼ when ʻthe core systemʼ [ʻs] 
humanitarian concern was not any more ʻtied up with ethnocentric, racist 
assumptions about non-Europeans and the justifications for empireʼ. Brown 
states: ʻAs [these ethnocentric and racist] assumptions were delegitimated in 
the course of the first half of the twentieth century, so the non-interventionism 
normative for the core system became normative for the system as a whole, 
and thus humanitarian intervention had to be reinvented and relegitimated at 
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the end of the century.ʼ (C. Brown 2002: 135, emphasis added)
 It remains unclear from the statement whether or not the ground for such 
ʻreinventionʼ comes together with a return of the already-delegitimated ʻracist 
or ethnocentric assumptionsʼ. What is clear in the language is the liberty for 
those in the (former?) core system to invent norms of intervention. Obviously it 
can be enjoyable for those who deem high their intelligence and the advantages 
in terms of the dominance in discourse. But this can also be blind and lead 
to a misuse of such power, which the international arena does not rarely see 
happen. As it is for sure another story about sovereignty or interventionism, 
about how that concept was incorporated and institutionalised in the non-
Western world is far from the same entertaining. With this awareness it is 
possible to have a second thought about the validity of the contention (hence 
policy justification) from that part of the world in defence of state autonomy.
 I make two aspects of tracing to show that this alternative story is less 
pleasant than thought-provoking. The first is to do with the expansion of 
international society understood as the international expression of liberalism. 
This process is at the same time a process for the different societies to interact 
with, assimilate, and effect the internalisation of, those imported Western 
ideational elements, followed their own domestic task demands. The second 
is connected with the character of such an expansion in modern history 
coupled with force and imposition. In tracing these aspects of international 
life, I account for the consistency between these ideations and decision. Some 
mechanisms of how these ideations effected rhetoric or position made in 
public will be explicated.
2.2.  Expansion of the society of sovereign states as universalisation of 
Western ideations
 Bull and Watson see European culture expanding to become a world 
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culture with important global political implications. In describing the 
expansion of international society, they trace the logic of such a system as the 
international expression of liberalism: sovereign states are the equivalent of 
free individuals (Bull and Watson 1984). In Anglo-American liberalism, which 
arises from largely endogenous developments, the distinction between public 
and private sphere, the democratic organization of the political sphere and 
the minimalisation of political intervention in the workings of the market 
are generally privileged. As many other societies and cultures locate social 
values and moral responsibility in the family, the tribe, or some other social 
units, the expansion can be understood as a process witnessing reconciliation 
of highly illiberal communities with a liberal international order of states. 
When these ideations were imported into non-western societies, they were 
subject to selection, reconciliation, new synthesis.
 Contrary to many may think, this process can hardly be regarded to have 
homogenised the non-Western world. One example is the Chinese endorsement 
of liberalism and the implication for its political expression in state building. 
China started its entry of international society during the tumultuous late 
imperial period, roughly extending from the first Opium War in 1839 to the 
fall of the last dynasty in 1911. The liberalist ideation (sovereignty) was first 
interpreted and applied to anthropomorphized state rather than to individual 
human beings, as envisaged in the West. C. Hughes observes that China 
chose to reinterpret the notion of liberalism as a master narrative of national 
salvation; and this ʻnarrative enables liberalism to be presented not so much 
as an argument privileging the liberty of individual human beings, but 
rather to be converted into an argument for the freedom of the community 
in a system of world politicsʼ (Hughes in Hovden and Keene 2002: 193-4). As 
observed by Schwarz, what was missing in this interpretation is ʻprecisely 
that which is often considered to be the ultimate spiritual core of liberalism, 
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the concept of the worth of persons within society as an end in itself, joined 
to the determination to shape social and political institutions to promote this 
valueʼ (Quote in Hughes: 199).
 In explaining what caused this distortion, Hughes interestingly endorsed it 
as ʻthe realization of the nature of Aristotleʼs “political animal” ʼ by those who 
first introduced into China these concepts such as Yan Fu (Hughes in H. K. 
2002: 201). This may not serve as a good explanation. To this I will return.
 The Chinese assimilation of liberalism in the early stage was propelled by a 
Faustian searching for national wealth and power, in which democracy is seen 
as ʻonly [a] plausible form through which [they] can reform and re-establish 
authorityʼ. Once the prior necessity was identified as for a programme of 
nation-building, the value of individual liberties turned out to be assessed in 
terms of their compatibility with the task of achieving freedom for the state 
as an actor in international society (Hughes in Hovden and Keene 2002: 198).
 Indeed, many followers of Bull and Watson fail to realize, the conception of 
national sovereignty in most states in the expanded society carries an explicitly 
separate and less clearly defined meaning than in Western philosophy. For 
these states, sovereignty is a mark of their collective dignity.
 As exemplified in the China case, in search of its national identity in 
international society, the Chinese has continuously resorted to the sovereignty 
norm to advance its broader state-building project. In its more recent version, 
national sovereignty serves to sustain domestic authority against foreign 
incursion. State authority has been assigned with central importance. A 
recent book about the United Nations offers one definition of sovereignty. It 
states:
 ʻThe crucial principle is that the national authorities which rule over the 
people within a specific area are the ultimate authority for dealing with 
140
Re-construction of Wellbeing?
all domestic and foreign policy. These authorities alone enjoy these rights 
and responsibilities, to the exclusion of any other actor.ʼ (Guo Longlong on 
Lianheguo Xinlun : New Theories about the UN: 1995: 14-15; also in Gill and 
Reilly 2000 in Survival: 42-43).
 While China has gone through tremendous changes along the centuries and 
in particular since the open door policy in the late 1970s in its embracement of 
Western institutions and culture, it remains difficult to find evidence to prove 
that today that part of the world has been homogeneous with this. At least for 
the conception of sovereignty, it is not the case.
2.3. Domestic task demands versus external imposition of ideations
 It should not be difficult to find similar cases of such ideation-expansion 
in Africa, South America and other parts of the worlds. As it can be seen, 
adopting or modelling a set of Western political and economic arrangements 
could be forced by either the motivation to get rid of disadvantage or direct 
coercion, being it military force or kinds of sanctions. But such adoption is 
not a cognitive internalisation. The Japanese adoption of Western economic 
and political arrangements in the last century is widely regarded as a success 
as showed in its being categorised as a ʻWestern countryʼ. But it is hard to 
deny that these institutionalised arrangements were accomplished in ways 
that reflect non-Western local culture norms. This leads to a discovery that 
in search of solutions to their own problems the state finds foreign models 
increasingly take second place to the native political and social intelligence. 
Domestic task demands tend to be a strong force in internalising foreign 
ideas. However Western these eventual institutional realisation might not 
be, it begs better understanding of the culture and history of these societies 
whose people seek to improve. This shows that the ʻrealisation of the nature 
141
千葉大学　公共研究　第 13 巻第１号（2017 年３月）
of political animal in Aristotleʼs senseʼ explanation confused a cause with a 
means.
 While reconciliation of foreign ideation may be motivated as domestic task 
demands, it is equally important to note that very often these endorsement 
of foreign ideations may not fit in domestic task demands (in a uninterrupted 
track). In celebrating universalism, it is easily forgotten that the expansion 
of European values across Africa, Asia and Americas was coupled with 
violence, conflict and leadership. In other words, the course is also a process 
of imposition by the powerful. Sociological institutionalists have argued that 
in most of the non-Western parts, the state is taken as organizational form of 
political entity not because of internal task demands, but rather the results of 
external cultural legitimation. In other words, the state as an organizational 
form has had to be imposed and indeed, propped up. Even those failed states 
must still be reconstructed as states rather than reorganized in some other 
way. This is so because the state form is a culturally and legitimately supported 
political form (Finnemore 1996: 342).
 In protesting this imposition character of the Western ideation, some seek 
to defend that non-Western values should be respected and maintained. One 
example is the Asian value argument which has gain some currency among in 
the East- and South Asia.
3. Universalism of human rights and the Asian Value claim
 Heated debate about the validity of the Asian Value thesis caught attention 
across borders in the 1990s after several delegations addressed cultural and 
value differences between Asia and the West.8 The central claim of this thesis 
is that there is a distinct Asian value which, unlike the Western culture, is less 
supportive of individualist freedom than concerned with order and discipline. 
Therefore the claim of democracy and human rights proposed by the West 
142
Re-construction of Wellbeing?
bears less relevance in Asia than in the West.
 Defenders of universalism tend to take two lines of argument. The first 
is prescriptive. They blame the claim as cultural relativism underscoring 
a culture-specific feature of moral standards. And the latter should not be 
accepted in international life.
 The second makes efforts to find shared elements underlying human rights 
in both cultures. For example, Sen sees that ʻthe view that the basic ideas 
underlying freedom and rights in a tolerant society are ʻWesternʼ notions and 
somehow alien to Asia, is hard to make any sense of, even though that view 
has been championed by both Asian authoritarian and Western chauvinistsʼ 
(Sen; 1997: 27). In Senʼs defending of universalism, he listed, from Buddhism 
to Hinduism in Asian traditions, the common elements endorsing freedom 
and supporting individuation.
 These arguments as I see it have largely missed the point. The charge of 
cultural relativism presumes it entails value relativism. It is moral or value 
relativism that they donʼt support, not Asian Value. If they donʼt endorse that 
value system itself they bear the burden to prove. The second case as seen in 
Senʼs work involving looking for similar elements in the two value systems 
does not suffice to prove that the Western value enjoys universality. The 
assumption is that universalism is a stereotyped programme that can be used 
as a measure. Secondly, even though elements can be found essentially similiar, 
there remains an important difference, namely, none of these elements Sen 
has found from the Asian traditions has been realised in Asian political and 
social practice in an institutionalised way. In another words, Sen seeks to 
8 For example, in 1993, at the World Congress on Human Rights in Vienna, the 
foreign minister of Singapore warned that universalism should not be used to mask 
the reality of diversity. And the Chinese delegation was actively promoting to make 
room for regional diversity in the framework of the declaration.
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prove such and such elements are of the same nature, but what turned out 
is like using a steelyard,: This is a case of mis-specification of values. Thirdly, 
the existence in remote traditions of certain values does not follow that these 
elements are still alive or viable to be resources of potential political value. 
Therefore the charge of the invalidity of Asian Value so provided is dismissible.
 The fact that the Western culture (rationality, individualism) has prevailed 
in history does not mean that we should overlook the resistance and conflicts 
in the process of its expansion to the non-west. And it does not mean that 
the globe can afford if theorists do not seriously address these resistance/
conflicts. Rather than denying the validity of Asian Value claim on ill-founded 
accusation, it does more justice to the fact by accepting it as one specification 
of universal human rights. If universalism has to be understood as descriptive, 
then minimum on the agenda can be given: since ʻstates consist of humans 
one must assume some common humanity: ʻ a minimal content of natural lawʼ, 
perhaps, which acknowledges universal human vulnerability and responds by 
a general rule of non-violence (H. L.A. Hart 1961: 189-95). On this basis, only 
if these elements cannot be found at all can Asian Value be charged as not a 
specification of universal human rights. I see two reasons why this will not 
happen: First of all it does not refute the Western value as a whole. Secondly, 
the difference it claims between the two is more of degree or extent than of 
nature.
 Furthermore what is more important underlying the Asian value claim, 
as I see it, is threefold: a). Behind the claim of distinct Asian Values lies the 
feeling of being weak, and even deeply the sense of being inferior, whatever 
cause may it be, In this sense, it is a voice from below of the status quo (very 
different from that of the Enlightenment, which voiced out the universalism 
of an elite class in a leading country of the Western world). B). It shows a 
certain self awareness of being different and at the same time being the same. 
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In this sense, it entails a claim for equal standing of the weak and small.
 Finally, cultures are not hermetically sealed units, but are composed of 
people who do engage in rational dialogue across communitarian boundaries. 
The crude comparison of stereotypes should give way to a better understanding 
of how the interaction between different communities can really take place. 
That is perhaps where International Relations can contribute to a peaceful 
world.
4. Concluding Remarks
 This article has looked at some phenomena about human right intervention 
and its related argument as a measure against the destruction human 
wellbeing and happiness. Some related arguments are also focused upon a 
current enormous attention about recent terrorist attacks in Paris, France, 
which have been originated from the Islamic State (IS).
 The nature of this issue is if and which body should be able to intervene 
a situation, and how can be done to attain the reconstruction of human 
wellbeing. However, it is in particular important for us to look at some 
current affairs in the world from a different observation of developing states. 
The nature of these arguments is if some policy actors in developed states 
can act upon, and on what basis and from which side an intervention can 
be justified and implemented. Nonetheless, it is true that ordinary Syrians 
are not their targets but they would definitely be wounded and died by air 
raids of the French Air Force, which has already started a counter attack 
on Syria. By invoking the same ground on human rights, we must seek to 
justify international legitimate military actions against the IS as a more 
moral demand. A corollary of this argument is if some intervention can be of 
ethical foreign policy, and it is not a dominant one only for developed states. If 
the West has been too constrained in their efforts to protect human wellbeing 
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in developing states, more political and practical measures are necessary to 
sustain their good will.
 Some of them claim that a new norm of humanitarianism has been emerging. 
However, the Paris terrorist attacks have been extensively reported all over the 
world. On the other hand, in the Arab world, the number of innocent victims 
in Syrian civil war has been least reported such as that in Paris. In spite 
of these conservatory issues, no national body has acted to intervene Syrian 
civilians and their wellbeing. Even defenders of human rights are not able 
to claim that ʻindividuals are entitled, regardless of nationality or ethnicity, 
to fundamental human dignityʼ. Is it too ideal and altruistic for a third party 
or policy maker to intervene human wellbeing and its related issues in a 
sovereign state such as in Syria where there were massive violations within 
the country?
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